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Ten Years of Charitable Choice 
Michele Estrin Gilman" 
In 1996, welfare reform legislation spurred heated debates over tough 
new work requirements for welfare recipients and lifetime limits on welfare 
benefits. I Advocates sought to eliminate dependency on government; 
opponents feared widespread impoverishment of women and children.2 In 
the midst of the uproar, then-Senator John Ashcroft quietly inserted a 
provision into the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRA) that garnered scant attention at that time but 
transformed the delivery of welfare services in this country and radically 
redefined the relationship between church and state.3 This provision, 
commonly known as charitable choice, permits government funding of 
religious organizations, including churches, synagogues, and mosques, to 
deliver welfare-related services.4 Prior to welfare reform, houses of worship 
and other sectarian organizations were not eligible to receive government 
funds to deliver social services.5 Instead, religious organizations that wanted 
to contract with government had to create secular affiliates and keep 
religious content out of their government-funded programs.6 These steps are 
no longer necessary. Charitable choice was the first major governmental 
lnitiative for direct funding of churches, and thus, it quickly became a 
lightning rod for dissension. The debate intensified with the election of 
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\. See GWENDOLYN MINK & ALICE O'CONNOR, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, AND POVERTY 813-15 (Gwendolyn Mink ed., 2004). 
2. Id. 
3. See AMY E. BLACK ET AL., OF LITTLE FAITH: THE POLITICS OF GEORGE W. BUSH'S FAITH 
BASED INITIATIVE 22-32 (2004). 
4. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2 \05,2161-63 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)). 
5. See Michele Estrin Gilman, "Charitable Choice" and the Accountability Challenge: 
Reconciling the NeedJor Regulation with the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 55 VAND. L. REv. 
799,811 (2002). 
6. Id. 
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President George W. Bush, who made expanding and enforcing charitable 
choice a centerpiece of his "compassionate conservatism" domestic agenda.7 
The controversy over charitable choice does not split along party, 
religious, or partisan lines. Religion plays a central and complex role in 
American society, and as a result, reactions to charitable choice splinter 
among and within the many constituencies impacted by the law. 8 Supporters 
believe that religion should playa greater role within civil society and that 
religious groups have been discriminated against in government contracting 
programs.9 Moreover, charitable choice advocates contend that a spiritual 
approach is more effective than a secular one in solving social problems. 10 
As then-Governor Bush stated, "Government can do certain things very 
well, but it cannot put hope in our hearts or a sense of purpose in our lives. 
That requires churches and synagogues and mosques and charities.,,11 
By contrast, many religious leaders fear that accepting government 
money would lead to increased bureaucratization of churches, church 
dependence on government funding, and government interference with 
religious practices. 12 In short, these critics fear that "government shekels" 
come with "government shackles.,,13 Some conservative religious leaders 
object to charitable choice because they do not want government money 
flowing to "objectionable" religious groups, such as Scientology and the 
Nation of Islam.14 On the left, liberal critics charge that charitable choice 
permits federally subsidized employment discrimination on the basis of 
7. See Mary Segers, President Bush's Faith-Based Initiative, in FAITH-BASED INlTlATIVES 
AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 1,5 (10 Renee Formicola et 
al. eds., 2003) (hereinafter FAITH-BASED INlTlATlVES). 
8. Id. at 3. Even within denominations, religious leaders are split on their support for the 
concept of charitable choice. Id. It is opposed by most mainline Protestants as well as most reform 
and conservative Jewish groups. Id. It is supported by most evangelical Protestants and Orthodox 
Jewish groups, while the U.S. Catholic Bishops Conference supports it with reservations. Id. 
African-American denominations are split over the wisdom of charitable choice. Id. 
9. The arguments on both sides of the charitable choice issue are summarized in BLACK ET 
AL., supra note 3, at 65-73 and FAITH-BASED INlTlATlVES, supra note 7, at 15-18, 161-81. 
10. See, e.g., Stanley Carlson-Thies, Faith Based Institutions Cooperating with Public 
Welfare: The Promise of the Charitable Choice Provision, in WELFARE REFORM AND FAITH BASED 
ORGANIZATIONS 29, 30 (Derek Davis & Barry Hankins eds., 1999). 
II. See FAITH-BASED INlTlA TlVES, supra note 7, at 31. 
12. See, e.g., David Saperstein, Appropriate and Inappropriate Use of Religion, in SACRED 
PLACES, CIVIC PURPOSES 297, 302--{)3 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & Ming Hsu Chen eds., 2001). 
13. See Jeffrey Polet & David K. Ryden, Past, Present, Future: Final Reflections on Faith-
Based Programs, in SANCTIONING RELIGION? POLITICS, LAW, AND FAITH-BASED PUBLIC SERVICES 
177, 181 (David K. Ryden & Jeffrey Polet eds., 2005) ("Others worry more about the religious 
entities themselves, and what might happen if they avail themselves of public dollars."). 
14. See, e.g., ARTHUR E. FARNSLEY II, RISING EXPECTATIONS: URBAN CONGREGATIONS, 
WELFARE REFORM, AND CIVIC LIFE 88 (2002) (quoting Reverend Jerry Falwell's concerns about 
funding Moslem organizations); Segers, supra note 7, at I (listing similar examples). 
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religion, because charitable choice exempts religious contractors from 
certain anti-discrimination employment laws. ls Liberal opponents also worry 
about religious coercion of welfare beneficiaries, as well as the quickly 
dissolving boundaries between church and state. 16 Further, critics worry that 
charitable choice is a step towards pushing the entire responsibility for 
alleviating poverty to the private sector, and they point to decreasing 
government funding for public benefits programs during the Bush 
Administration. 17 
In 1996, these arguments were mostly speculative. We now have ten 
years of experience with charitable choice to begin to assess its impact and 
to consider its future role. One thing is certain: charitable choice is here to 
stay. In 2005, the White House reported that federal agencies awarded over 
$2.15 billion to faith-based organizations, accounting for 10.9% of the total 
funding distributed through 158 programs and seven federal agencies. 18 
Health and Human Services ("HHS"), which administers many welfare-
related programs, increased its awards to faith-based organizations by 88% 
between 2002 and 2004. 19 The definition of "faith-based organizations" is 
muddled, because these organizations vary tremendously in how much 
emphasis they place on faith and in the sort of ties they may have with 
religion in tenns of funding, staffing, governance, and adherence to the 
nonns of religious bodies.2o While congregations are a subset of faith-based 
organizations, they are conceptually different because their primary mission 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2000). 
16. See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 65-73; FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at 
15-18,161-81. 
17. See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 65-73; FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at 
15-18,161-81. 
18. See Claire Hughes, White House Report: Federal Grants to FBOs Up in 2005, 
ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION AND SOC. POL'y (2006), http://www.socialpolicyandreligion.org! 
news/article.cfm?id=3967. 
19. [d. 
20. See ROBERT WUTHNOW, SAVING AMERICA? FAITH-BASED SERVICES AND THE FUTURE 
OF CIVIL SOCIETY 138-49 (2004); see also FREDRICA D. KRAMER ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, 
FEDERAL POLICY ON THE GROUND: FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS DELIVERING SOCIAL SERVICES 
67 (2005), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311197_ DP05-0I.pdf. The article 
notes: 
[d. 
The term encompasses a wide variety of organizations, including large and small, 
affiliates and independents, community-based and congregation-based, and providers 
of secular and faith-infused services. Given this breadth, the term has limited meaning 
for analytic purposes. It is sufficiently politically charged that organizations may label 
themselves as faith-based in the belief that doing so will help get them money, or 
disavow the label for fear that accepting it would buy into administration initiatives 
they oppose. 
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is not social service.21 Nevertheless, it is safe to say that within this broad 
definitional umbrella, religious groups now deliver a wide array of 
government-funded, welfare-related services, including job trammg, 
employment placement, emergency housing, parenting classes, life skills 
training, substance abuse treatment, teen abstinence counseling, and child 
care.22 Moreover, the Deficit Reduction Act of2005, which reauthorized the 
1996 welfare reform statute, provides $100 million per year for five years 
for healthy marriage promotion efforts, and $50 million per year over five 
years for responsible fatherhood programs.23 Government agencies are 
actively recruiting religious groups as grantees for these funds.24 
Yet despite the billions of dollars flowing to religious organizations to 
deliver human services, there has been little scrutiny of whether charitable 
choice is effective in fighting poverty.25 This article discusses the benefits 
and limitations of charitable choice. To begin with, charitable choice 
requires a constitutional balance too precarious for many religious groups to 
maintain.26 Numerous lawsuits are challenging overtly religious programs, 
usually delivered by white, evangelical Christian religious groups, which 
coerce participants into following the grantee organization's religious 
beliefs.27 Religious content is spilling over into welfare programs partly 
because there are few accountability mechanisms in place to ensure that 
religious grantees respect constitutional boundaries or deliver on contractual 
obligations.28 In addition, the government is spending millions of dollars to 
convince churches to apply for charitable choice grants, yet most 
congregations lack the institutional capacity to deliver many welfare-related 
services, which require professional skills and sophisticated contract and 
21. See WUTHNOW, supra note 20, at 149; see also id. at 171 ("The comparison between 
faith-based organizations and congregations becomes especially important for making broader 
observations about the role of religion in providing social services."). 
22. The White House provides an annual catalogue of available grant opportunities for 
religious organizations. See Federal Funds for Organizations That Help Those In Need (2006), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/governmentlfbcilgrants-catalog-05-2006.pdf (listing more 
than 170 programs with grant opportunities). 
23. Deficit Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7103 (2005). 
24. See ANNE FARRIS, RICHARD P. NATHAN & DAVID J. WRIGHT, THE ROUNDTABLE ON 
RELIGION AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY, THE EXPANDING ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY: GEORGE 
W. BUSH AND THE FAITH BASED INITIATIVE 14-20 (August 2004), http://www.religionandsocial 
policy.orgidocs/policy/FB_Administrative_Presidency_Report_10_08_04.pdf. 
25. See infra Part ILA (discussing the difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of charitable 
choice). 
26. See infra Part LB. 
27. See infra Part II.A. 
28. ld. 
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program management.29 Finally, there is scant empirical evidence that a 
spiritual approach is superior to a secular one in delivering welfare services, 
suggesting that the constitutional risks are simply not worth taking.3o Despite 
the defects underlying current charitable choice programs, one insight of 
civil society proponents remains true--congregations have great reserves of 
social capital that can be successfully channeled in the fight against 
poverty.31 Particularly in low-income communities, churches play an 
instrumental role in connecting people to one another, to other organizations, 
and to available social services. 
Thus, the challenge is getting government to partner productively with 
churches, while avoiding the dangers inherent in charitable choice. This 
article argues that these goals can be achieved. Part I of the article describes 
the charitable choice statute, the governing constitutional framework, and 
the precarious balance between religiosity and neutrality that underlies 
charitable choice. Part II analyzes the flaws of charitable choice as an anti-
poverty mechanism, concluding that the constitutional dangers of charitable 
choice far outweigh the benefits of current faith-based contracting. Part III 
uses African-American churches as a model to show how congregations 
generate social capital, which consists of trust relationships that arise 
between individuals involved in social networks. Part IV proposes 
alternative ways for government to partner with religious organizations that 
avoid the shortcomings associated with charitable choice, while seizing upon 
the substantial social capital offered by these groups. In brief, this Part 
suggests that churches are ill-suited for delivering welfare counseling 
services that are transformative in nature, but ideally suited to deliver 
discrete, sustenance-based services as well as to serve as links between the 
needy and other community groups and governmental agencies. 
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF CHARITABLE CHOICE 
Charitable choice had its genesis in a group of conservative scholars, 
policymakers, and politicians who banded together in the early 1990s with 
the goal of bringing religion more overtly into the public square.32 For these 
actIvlsts, government aid is bureaucratic, impersonal, and breeds 
dependency.33 By contrast, churches can provide spiritual solace and moral 
29. See infra Part II.B. 
30. See infra Part II.A. 
31. See ;,ifra Part III. 
32. See Jo Renee Fonnicola, The Good in the Faith-Based Initiative. in FAITH-BASED 
INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at 28-45; BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 46-48 (describing the influence 
of the Center for Public Justice and its goals of "finding a more welcome place for Christian groups 
and ideas in the public square"). 
33. Id. at 27 ("Most ofthese thinkers believed that government alone could not provide-and 
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guidance to poor individuals that will lift them out of poverty.34 As Texas 
Governor, George W. Bush was one of the first political leaders to put the 
ideas of these conservative, religious thinkers into practice. 35 He established 
a state policy of partnering with religious groups to deliver social services. 36 
For President Bush, charitable choice has both personal and political 
resonance. On a personal level, charitable choice appeals to Bush because of 
his own religious conversion, which helped him overcome personal 
problems. 37 As a political matter, charitable choice allows Bush to appeal 
not only to his electoral base of religious conservatives and evangelicals, but 
also to court potential supporters among urban Latinos and African 
Americans, who tend to vote Democratic while also being strongly 
religious.38 President Bush has aggressively and effectively expanded 
charitable choice. This Part sets forth the parameters and scope of charitable 
choice and examines its legality. 
A. Charitable Choice Legislation 
The PRA created the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (T ANF) 
block grant that states administer to qualifying needy families. 39 The PRA's 
stated purposes are to reduce welfare dependency and out-of-wedlock births 
and to encourage the formation of two-parent families.4o The PRA gives the 
states considerable flexibility to create their own welfare programs with their 
T ANF funds as long as they meet these objectives. In addition, states have 
the option of further devolving welfare operations to the county and city 
level, and to private organizations if they choose. Under the charitable 
choice provision, states can further opt to provide welfare services through 
contracts with charitable, religious, or private organizations, or to provide 
beneficiaries with vouchers that are redeemable with such private 
organizations.41 Since the PRA, charitable choice provisions have been 
was not providing-effective welfare."}. 
34. Id. at 36 (quoting Indianapolis mayor Stephen Goldmith, who wrote that "church based 
efforts provide needy individuals with a source of strength and the moral impetus for personal 
change that government simply cannot"). 
35. See id. at 26. 
36. Id. 
37. See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 88; FARRIS ET AL.,supra note 24, at 3. 
38. See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 87-89. 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). The TANF program replaced the prior welfare system, known as 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 
40. Id. 
4 I. Id. § 604a. 
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included in a variety of other social service statutes.42 Moreover, President 
Bush has expanded charitable choice through the entire human services 
bureaucracy by utilizing executive orders.43 
The charitable choice legislation in the PRA was carefully crafted with 
input from several lawyers and academics to ease First Amendment church-
state separation concerns while simultaneously preserving the religious 
character of the grantees.44 Religious organizations receiving charitable 
choice funds have several rights under the statute. To begin with, 
governmental entities cannot discriminate against religious organizations in 
awarding contracts,45 nor can they interfere with the religious organization's 
"control over the definition, development, practice, and expression of its 
religious beliefs."46 In addition, religious organizations receiving charitable 
choice funds need not alter their internal governance structures or remove 
religious art, icons, or other symbols from their premises.47 Finally, religious 
organizations are exempt from Title VII's nondiscrimination in employment 
requirements.48 
Beneficiaries also have defined rights. Most importantly, charitable 
choice funds cannot be used for proselytizing or worship.49 In addition, 
states must provide nonsectarian alternatives for beneficiaries who object to 
the religious character of their provider;50 the T ANF regulations that 
implement the PRA require that service providers give notice to 
beneficiaries informing them of this right. Under the statute, religious 
organizations cannot discriminate against beneficiaries on the basis of 
religion or religious beliefs.51 With regard to accountability, the statute 
provides that religious organizations are subject to the same regulations as 
other contractors "to account in accord with generally accepted auditing 
42. See Community Services Block Grant Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. \05-285 (codified as 42 
U.S.C. § 9920 (2003»; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. \06-3\0 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 290kk-l (2003»; Community Renewal Tax Relief Act 
of2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554 (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-14). 
43. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
44. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, I \0 Stat. 2105, § 104(b) (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 
604a). ("The purpose of this section is to allow States to contract with religious organizations, or to 
allow religious organizations to accept certificates on the same basis as any other nongovernmental 
provider without impairing the religious character of such organizations, and without diminishing 
the religious freedom of beneficiaries of assistance funded under such program."). 
45. Jd. § 104(c). 
46. Jd. § 104(d)(I). 
47. Jd. § 104(d)(2). 
48. Jd. § 104(f). 
49. Jd. § 104(j). 
50. 110 Stat. 2105, § 104(e)(I). 
51. Jd. § 104(g). 
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principles for the use of such funds," although the organization can 
segregate federal funds into separate accounts and limit any audit to those 
accounts. 52 Finally, the statute provides that any party seeking to enforce its 
rights may file a civil suit for injunctive relief in state court. 53 
The scope and scale of charitable choice have expanded dramatically 
since the PRA was enacted. Although President Clinton did little to 
implement charitable choice, the terrain changed dramatically when 
President Bush took office in 2001.54 President Bush sought not only to 
enforce the charitable choice provisions in the PRA, but also to expand 
charitable choice across the entire human services bureaucracy. 55 Within 
weeks of taking office, he announced the formation of the high-profile 
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives 
("WHOFBCI") as well as satellite offices in five Cabinet-level agencies.56 
By executive order, he directed these offices to identify and remove 
regulatory barriers that discouraged federal human services contracting with 
faith-based groups, declaring that that government should provide a "level 
playing field" between religious and secular grant applicants. 57 The White 
House also issued a report contending that religious organizations were 
discriminated against in the contracting process. 58 
President Bush has failed repeatedly at getting Congress to pass his 
expansion of charitable choice into law because opponents, having learned 
their lesson in 1996, have effectively portrayed the proposed bills as 
permitting federally funded religious discrimination in employment.59 
Nevertheless, the President has used the prerogatives of his office, including 
a series of executive orders, to make an end-run around Congress.60 
Moreover, WHOFBCI and the satellite offices, which have now grown to 
cover eleven agencies, aggressively promote charitable choice across the 
country by conducting outreach sessions, conferences, and workshops to 
52. ld. § 104(h). 
53. ld. § 104(i). 
54. See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 62. 
55. See generally FARRIS ET AL., supra note 24. 
56. Exec. Order No. 13, 199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001); see also BLACK ET AL., 
supra note 3, at 202. 
57. Exec. Order No. 13, 199. 
58. WHITE HOUSE FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD: 
BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION BY FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN FEDERAL 
SOCIAL SERVICE PROGRAMS (Aug. 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/#/newslreleases/200l/08/ 
2001 081 6-3-report.pdf. 
59. See Segers, supra note 7, at 8-11. 
60. See Michele Estrin Gilman, If At First You Don't Succeed. Sign an Executive Order: 
President Bush and the Expansion a/Charitable Choice, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 
2007). 
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educate state officials and religious organizations about available grants and 
how to apply for them.61 Grant announcements at all levels of government 
now explicitly state that faith-based groups are not only eligible to compete 
for federal grants, but also that they are especially encouraged to apply.62 As 
noted earlier, these executive branch efforts are yielding results-billions of 
dollars are being funneled toward religious organizations to deliver human 
services.63 
Although a future president could rescind President Bush's executive 
orders, ignore the PRA' s charitable choice provisions, and shut down the 
WHOFBCI, this is unlikely to happen regardless of which party wins office 
in 2008. Likely candidates from both political parties have been touting the 
benefits of religious influence in public life.64 In the current political climate, 
no candidate or politician wants to look anti-religion, and thus, dismantling a 
large component of the federal bureaucracy would be a difficult political 
sell. In short, charitable choice is now a permanent fixture of the human 
services bureaucracy. 
B. The Constitutional Context 
The drafters of charitable choice aimed to create a law that would pass 
constitutional muster under the U.S. Supreme Court's quickly changing 
religion clause jurisprudence.65 The drafters had to predict where the Court's 
First Amendment currents would lead, but they also saw an opportunity to 
61. See DAVE DONALDSON & STANLEY CARLSON-THIES, A REVOLUTION OF COMPASSION 
73 (2003). 
62. See Federal Funds for Organizations That Help Those in Need (2006), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/governmentlfbcilgrants-catalog-05-2006.pdf (listing more than 150 
programs with grant opportunities for faith-based organizations); see also FARRIS ET AL., supra note 
24. 
63. See WHOFBCI Accomplishments in 2006, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
governmentlfbcil2006_accomplishments.html ("Competitive Federal grants to faith-based 
organizations (FBOs) increased for the third straight year in FY2005. More than $2.1 billion in 
grants were awarded to religious organizations in FY2005 by seven federal agencies."); see also 
Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Urges More Money for Religious Charities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,2006, at 
AI (stating in 2005, the President awarded over $2 billion in faith-based grants). 
64. See, e.g., Anne E. Kornblut, Political Memo; For This Red Meat Crowd, Obama's '08 
Choice Is Clear, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,2006, at A21 (Sen. Barack Obama, a potential Democratic 
candidate, "has earned a reputation for persuasive rhetoric about the role of religion in politics"); 
Raymond Hernandez, Hillary Clinton's Popularity Up in State, Even Among Republicans, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005, at BI (likely candidate and Democrat, Senator Hilary Clinton often makes 
references to faith and prayer); Adam Nagoumey, McCain Emphasizing His Conservative Bona 
Fides, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, at I (describing Republican Senator John McCain's efforts to reach 
out to Rev. Jerry Falwell in advance of a likely presidential run). 
65. Law professor Carl Esbeck was integral in drafting the statute. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert 
W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. I, 4 n.20 (2005) 
(noting the role Prof. Esbeck played as an advisor to Senator Ashcroft, the sponsor of charitable 
choice in the PRA); BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 45-49 (same). 
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shape the course of the flow. The Supreme Court has not ruled on any aspect 
of charitable choice, although cases are working through the system that 
may eventually be reviewed. Certiorari has been granted on the complicated 
issue of whether taxpayers have standing to challenge charitable choice 
programs.66 Most scholars agree that government funding of faith-based 
providers is permissible under the First Amendment as interpreted by the 
current Court,67 although some scholars object to the state of the law.68 At 
the same time, the lower federal courts are striking down specific charitable 
choice programs for straying beyond permissible boundaries.69 In short, 
charitable choice may be constitutional on its face but is far more 
problematic as applied.7o As a result, numerous charitable choice programs 
have been subject to litigation,71 and we can expect continued litigation as 
courts define the parameters of permissible charitable choice programs. 
Under the First Amendment's religion clauses, "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof."n Charitable choice is usually contested on Establishment Clause 
grounds. Opponents of charitable choice view it as an unlawful 
establishment of religion because government is not only funding religious 
organizations but also giving its imprimatur to religion as a solution for 
social problems.73 This risks religious coercion of welfare recipients, as well 
66. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. 
granted, 127 S. Ct. 722 (2006). 
67. See e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 65 ("Changes in the law of the religion clauses have 
rendered it constitutionally plausible, but hardly unassailable."). 
68. See Steven K. Green, Charitable Choice and Neutrality Theory, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 33, 45-46 (2000); Alan Brownstein, Constitutional Questions About Charitable Choice, in 
WELFARE REFORM & F AITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 10, at 219-{;5. 
69. See infra cases discussed in Part I.C, as well as the comprehensive listing of charitable 
choice litigation, including pending cases, at The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy, 
Legal Updates, http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legaVlega_updates.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 
2007). 
70. There are a variety of other constitutional issues raised by charitable choice, including 
the constitutionality of the exemption from employment discrimination laws for charitable choice 
grantees. See generally Steven K. Green, Religious Discrimination, Public Funding, and 
Constitutional Values, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. I (2002); Melissa McClellan, Faith and 
Federalism: Do Charitable Choice Provisions Preempt State Nondiscrimination Employment 
Laws?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv., 1437 (2004). On other constitutional issues, see generally, Lupu 
& Tuttle, supra note 65. 
71. See Diana B. Henriques & Andrew Lehren, Religion for Captive Audiences, With 
Taxpayers Footing the Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,2006, at All. 
72. U.s. CONST. AMEND. I. 
73. See Paul Weber, The Bad in the Faith-Based Initiative, in FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, 
supra note 7, at 63, 92 (summarizing the First Amendment objections to charitable choice); David 
Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 559, 561 (2002) ("The initiative is premised in significant part on the conviction that because 
oftheir faith, religious providers are better than their secular counterparts at delivering certain social 
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as the opportunity for government to prefer certain religious organizations 
over others.74 By contrast, supporters of charitable choice argue that keeping 
churches out of government-contracting programs results in discrimination 
against religion in violation of the Establishment Clause's emphasis on 
neutrality.75 Under a neutrality model, "individuals and religious groups 
[can] participate fully and equally with their fellow citizens in America's 
public life, without being forced either to shed or disguise their religious 
convictions or character.,,76 Although the Court's Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is convoluted and rapidly changing,77 there are clear signals as 
to how the Court would evaluate charitable choice. 
The starting point for the analysis is Bowen v. Kendrick, a case that pre-
dates charitable choice by eight years, in which the Court considered the 
extent to which government aid can flow to religiously affiliated social 
service providers. 78 In Bowen, the Court addressed the constitutionality of 
the Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA"), a statute that made government 
grants available to public and nonprofit private organizations, including 
religious organizations, to counsel and educate teenagers about reproduction 
and sexuality. 79 The challengers contended that grants to religious 
organizations violated the Establishment Clause.8o The Court ruled that the 
AFLA was constitutional on its face, but that individual AFLA grants might 
violate the Establishment Clause as applied.81 The Court's opinion largely 
services. "). 
74. See Weber, supra note 73, at 65-67 (discussing coercion and discrimination objections). 
75. See. e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Neutral Treatment of Religion and Faith-Based Social 
Service Providers: Charitable Choice and Its Critics, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED 
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 68, at 180-82. In addition, some prominent charitable choice 
supporters contend that religious organizations that participate in charitable choice should be free 
from regulatory burdens that apply to secular grantees, arguing that the First Amendment permits, or 
even mandates, such exemptions to avoid government interference with religion. See Carl H. 
Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service 
Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1,23-27 (1997). This viewpoint is not consistent with current law. See 
Gilman, supra note 5, at 871-81 (explaining that religious organizations are subject to neutral laws 
of general applicability). Also, contrary to the claims of some charitable choice supporters, it is clear 
that governments are not required to adopt charitable choice, i.e. to open up social service 
contracting to religious organizations. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (holding that 
the State of Washington did not have to provide college scholarships to students pursuing devotional 
degrees). 
76. Esbeck, supra note 75, at 21. 
77. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 804 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion) ("[Olur 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has shifted in recent times, while nevertheless retaining 
anomalies with which the lower courts have had to struggle."). 
78. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988). 
79. Id. at 593-96. 
80. !d. at 596-97. 
81. The Court applied the three-part purpose-effect-entanglement test for analyzing 
Establishment Clause challenges set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), which has 
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hinged on its conclusion that as long as funds were not going towards 
"pervasively sectarian" organizations, there was no risk of government 
advancing, inhibiting, or excessively entangling itself with religion.82 At that 
time, the ban on direct aid to pervasively sectarian institutions had a long 
pedigree in cases involving aid to parochial schools.83 Although the AFLA 
survived facial attack, the Court remanded the case back to the district court 
to determine whether the AFLA was unconstitutional as applied; that is, 
whether some AFLA aid was flowing to pervasively sectarian grantees 
and/or whether the aid was used to fund specifically religious activities.84 
The Court indicated that either of these uses would be unconstitutiona1.85 
Bowen approved government funding of religious organizations to 
combat social problems as long as the aid money finances only secular 
activities and as long as religious organizations are not preferred over 
secular groupS.86 Thus, Bowen embodies the Court's move away from 
separationist rhetoric that had long dominated its religion-clause 
jurisprudence toward a more neutral vision, under which both the secular 
and sectarian are entitled to equal treatment by govemment.8? However, 
Bowen also takes a strong stance against the funding of "pervasively 
sectarian" institutions.88 The Court has vaguely defined "pervasively 
sectarian" organizations as those in which the "secular activities cannot be 
separated from sectarian ones.,,89 Parochial schools and houses of worship fit 
squarely within this definition.9o Charitable choice violates the pervasively 
sectarian test because its very purpose is to involve churches, synagogues, 
mosques, and the like in welfare delivery without requiring these 
organizations to set up affiliated, nonsectarian nonprofits. Yet since Bowen, 
the Court has moved away from the "pervasively sectarian" test, and 
accordingly, a majority of the Court no longer considers the nature of the 
since been modified under Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). Under the Agostini analysis, the 
Court first asks whether the statute has a secular purpose and then looks to the effect of the statute by 
asking whether the government aid (I) results in government indoctrination; (2) defines its recipients 
by reference to religion; or (3) creates an excessive entanglement. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233-34. 
82. Lemon,403 U.S. at 610-18. 
83. See Gilman, supra note 5, at 865 n.323. 
84. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,622-23 (1988). 
85. [d. 
86. [d. at 608, 616. 
87. For a description of the Court's move toward a neutrality theory of the religion clauses, 
see generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our 
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 57--60 (2002). 
88. [d. at 609-12. 
89. Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976). 
90. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,621 (1988). 
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organization receiving aid to be detenninative.91 This'shift accords with the 
goals of the drafters of charitable choice who felt that religious organizations 
were being unfairly excluded from government programs.92 
The Court shed the pervasively sectarian concept in a series of cases 
involving government aid to parochial schools; which, like charitable choice, 
raise concerns about government indoctrination and entanglement.93 Thus, 
the education cases are likely predictors of how the Court would treat 
charitable choice. The leading case in this area is Mitchell v. Helms, in 
which the Court upheld a federal program that provided educational 
equipment and materials, such as computers, software, and VCRs, to 
economically disadvantaged public and private schools, including religious 
schools.94 The Justices articulated three sharply differing positions about the 
aid program. A four vote plurality consisting of Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, 
Scalia, and Kennedy, concluded that the Establishment Clause is not 
violated as long as the aid lacks religious content and is distributed based on 
neutral criteria.95 For the plurality, the actual use of the aid or the character 
of the recipient is irrelevant.96 By contrast, the dissenting Justices, consisting 
of Souter, Stevens, and Ginsberg, contended that any fonn of government 
aid that could potentially be diverted towards religious activities violates the 
Establishment Clause.97 
The controlling opinion, authored by concurring Justice O'Connor and 
joined by Justice Breyer, falls between these two positions.98 Whereas 
Bowen focused on the religious character of the recipient as the touchstone 
for satisfying the Establishment Clause, the Mitchell concurrence focuses 
instead on how the aid is actually used by grantees. Justice O'Connor 
reaffinned the rule set forth in prior direct-aid cases that government aid 
cannot be used to advance or inhibit religion.99 Thus, the government 
violates the Establishment Clause when it endorses religion, that is, when a 
"reasonable observer would naturally perceive the aid program as 
91. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (discussed infra Part II.C). 
92. See Jeffrey Polet & David K. Ryden, Religion. the Constitution. and Charitable Choice, 
in SANCTIONING RELIGION?, supra note 13, at 19. 
93. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 65, at 21-26 (describing the shifts in the Court's 
jurisprudence with regard to direct government financing of schools). 
94. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
95. [d. at 826. 
96. [d. at 814-15, 820, 827. 
97. [d. at 890 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
98. [d. at 840 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
99. [d. at 844-45 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997». 
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government support for the advancement of religion."loo Accordingly, 
Justice O'Connor concluded that the government can provide religiously 
neutral aid to parochial schools as long as the aid is distributed to both 
secular and sectarian schools on a neutral basis and is not, in fact, diverted 
for religious· purposes.· Moreover, O'Connor detennined that because 
religious indoctrination with government funds is impennissible, the 
government must have adequate safeguards for preventing the unlawful 
diversion of funds for religious purposes. IOI For the concurrence, all of these 
conditions were satisfied in Mitchell. lo2 Whereas Bowen focused on the 
religious character of the recipient as the touchstone for satisfying the 
Establishment Clause, Mitchell focuses instead on how the aid is actually 
used by grantees. 
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court further stressed the concept of 
neutrality and created a safe harbor for voucher programs, a fonn of indirect 
government aid.103 Whereas direct government aid involves contracting 
directly with a religious provider to deliver services, indirect aid involves 
giving private individuals vouchers, which they may use at any provider that 
accepts the vouchers. I04 In a 5-4 decision, the majority approved the 
Cleveland school district's use of tuition vouchers for low-income 
elementary school students to attend the private schools of their choice, 
including religious schools. lOS The majority reasoned that the intervening 
private choice of parents to use their vouchers to send their children to 
parochial schools erased any state responsibility for religious 
indoctrination. 106 Accordingly, indirect aid programs are pennissible if there 
is independent choice by beneficiaries and government neutrality in 
selecting participating schools. 107 This would seem to portend an explosion 
of voucher programs in the social services field because it avoids the 
100. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 843. In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O'Connor explained that 
unlawful endorsement occurs when the government sends "a message to non-adherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668,668 (\984). For a critique of the endorsement test, see Jesse Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its 
Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499 (2002). 
101. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 858-62. 
102. Id. at 867. 
103. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
104. See Cole, supra note 73, at 565 ("Contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
draws a sharp line between direct government aid, which generally may not support religious 
activity, and indirect aid routed through private individual choice, such as vouchers, which may 
generally support religious activity without creating a constitutional problem unless the private 
routing is a transparent fiction."). 
105. Id. at 662-63. 
106. Id. at 650-52. 
107. Id. 
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complicated questions about the appropriate uses of direct aid under 
Mitchell. Yet voucher programs in low-income communities can be 
problematic as a policy matter because beneficiaries may not be able to gain 
information about available services or to evaluat~ services rendered. 108 
Also, som~ jurisdictions cannot maintain a competitive market of service 
providers from which to choose, making the notion of choice meaningless. 
Regardless of the constitutional appeal of voucher programs, most welfare-
related programs are still structured as direct aid programs. This is because 
social service providers need to maintain their capacity to respond to 
fluctuating demand and cannot run on fee-for-service arrangements. 109 
Under both Mitchell and Zelman, charitable choice's direct aid 
provision would likely satisfy current constitutional standards because it 
requires government nondiscrimination in selecting grantees, and the aid is 
not permitted to be used for "sectarian worship, instruction, or 
proselytization.,,11O Although Justice O'Connor is no longer on the Court, 
the newest members, Justices Roberts and Alito, are expected to hold views 
on the religion clauses that would support charitable choice. III Still, it 
remains to be seen whether they would go as far as the plurality in Mitchell, 
which concluded that as long as distributional criteria are neutral, and the 
purposes of the program are secular, the actual use of government aid is 
irrelevant. 112 In sum, at the current time, charitable choice appears to be 
facially valid, but its application has run into constitutional problems. 
C. Charitable Choice Litigation 
Numerous lawsuits have been filed challenging direct aid programs on 
the grounds that the government funds were used for religious activities. 113 
108. See Jo ANNE SCHNEIDER, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND WELFARE REFORM: ORGANIZATIONS, 
CONGREGATIONS, AND COMMUNITIES 234 (2006) ("People of the rising educated and established 
middle class have the skills to evaluate these options, but this is far less likely to be the case for 
regular users of these systems."); Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling 
After the End of Welfare as We Knew It, 49 DUKE LJ. 493, 535 (1999) ("Autonomous choice is in 
jeopardy when the individual has no money, food, or housing and is offered these necessities on 
conditions that she might quickly refuse under other circumstances."). 
109. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 87, at 74. 
110. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)(j) (2000). 
III. See Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 749 n.106 (2006) ("[B]oth of them [Roberts and Alito] expressed views prior 
to serving on the bench that contribute to the perception that they will join the other three 
conservatives on most issues relating to church/state issues."). 
112. See IRA Lupu & ROBERT TuTTLE, THE STATE OF THE LAW 2005: LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND FAITH BASED 
ORGANIZATIONS 19-20 (2005), available at http://www.socialpolicyandreligion.org/publications/ 
publication.cfm?id=67. 
113. See cases gathered at The Roundtable on Social and Religious Policy, Legal Updates, 
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Under Mitchell, government aid provided on a neutral basis to secular and 
sectarian organizations does not violate the Establishment Clause, yet actual 
diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination does. Accordingly, as 
discussed below, charitable choice programs tend to run into constitutional 
trouble when they push overtly religious messages that could coerce 
vulnerable populations, particularly prisoners and children. The overt 
religious content in many of the challenged programs not only threatens the 
free exercise rights of program beneficiaries, but also can amount to a 
government endorsement of religion in violation of the Establishment 
Clause. 
A major recent opinion comes from Iowa, where Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State challenged the InnerChange Freedom 
Initiative (InnerChange), a pre-release prison program at the Newton 
Correctional Facility designed to rehabilitate inmates and reduce 
recidivism. I 14 After a lengthy trial, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Iowa held that the program was unlawful, and the court 
not only enjoined the program, but also ordered that InnerChange repay the 
state of Iowa over $1.5 million in spent funds. 115 The court found that 
program participants were required to spend hours each day engaging in 
Bible study, as well as to attend daily religious devotional practice, worship 
services, and weekly revivals. 116 In addition, InnerChange taught inmates 
that criminal behavior is a sin, which can only be remedied "through a 
miraculous delivery by God-specifically, God in ChriSt.,,117 The court 
found further that the religious nature of the program precluded non-
Evangelical Christian inmates from participating. 118 The Court stated, "The 
overtly religious atmosphere of the InnerChange program is not simply an 
overlay or a secondary effect of the program-it is the program.,,119 Thus, 
"For all practical purposes, the state has literally established an Evangelical 
Christian congregation within the walls of one of its penal institutions, 
giving the leaders of that congregation, i.e., InnerChange employees, 
authority to control the spiritual, emotional, and physical lives of hundreds 
of Iowa inmates.,,120 These actions constituted "severe" violations of the 
Establishment Clause, resulting in unlawful promotion of religion, 
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legaLupdates.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2007). 
114. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 
432 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2006). 
115. Id. at 941. 
116. Id. at 901-03. 
117. Id. at 875. 
118. !d. at 898-99. 
119. Id. at 922. 
120. Americans United/or Separation a/Church and State, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 933. 
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incentives for inmates to engage in religious observance, and government 
financial support for religious indoctrination. 121 
In a similar case involving a prison program in Pennsylvania, a federal 
district court judge rejected a series of motions to dismiss a lawsuit that 
challenged government welfare grants to the Firm Foundation, a vocational 
training program and self-described "prison ministry" for inmates. 122 The 
program requires staff to adhere to Christian beliefs, actively proselytizes 
inmates, and does not segregate government funds for secular purposes. 123 
The plaintiffs contend that such a program violated the Establishment 
Clause. 124 
Other cases abound. For example, the ACLU settled a case with the 
Department of Health and Human Services that challenged a one million 
dollar grant to a sexual abstinence program called the Silver Ring Thing 
(SRT).125 SRT held high-tech multimedia shows where members testified 
about how Jesus Christ improved their lives, quoted Bible passages, and 
urged teenagers to commit their lives to Jesus Christ and to purchase rings 
that were inscribed with New Testament verse. 126 In the settlement, HHS 
ended funding for the program as it is currently structured, made future 
funds contingent on the SRT's compliance with charitable choice 
restrictions, and agreed to closely monitor any future grants to the 
program.127 The settlement agreement also incorporated a list of safeguards 
that HHS would impose on any future grants with SRT; this document 
"represents the clearest and most complete legal guidance for faith-based 
grantees that has thus far been produced" by the government. 128 HHS 
terminated its grant to SRT in January 2006, and the SRT is not currently 
receiving funds from HHS.129 
In another case involving an abstinence program, American Civil 
Liberties Union v. Foster, a federal district court in Louisiana enjoined a 
121. ld.at939. 
122. Moeller v. Bradford County, 2006 WL 319288 (M.D. Pa., Feb. 10,2006); Moeller v. 
Bradford, 444 F. Supp. 2d 316 (M.D. Pa. 2006). 
123. Moeller, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 318. 
124. Id. 
125. See Raja Misha, U.S. To End Funding of Abstinence Program. Settles a Lawsuit Filed 
by the ACLU, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2006. 
126. See Frank James, Faith-Based Organizations Face Suits-Groups Using Federal Funds 
Are Accused of Proselytizing, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 2006, at 8. 
127. Id. 
128. IRA Lupu & ROBERT TuTTLE, THE STATE OF THE LAW 2006: LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 
AFFECTING PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND FAITH BASED ORGANIZATIONS iii 
(Roundtable on Religion and Social Policy 2006), available at http://www.religionandsocialpolicy. 
orgldocs/legallreports/State_oLthe_Law_2006.pdf (last visited Feb. 21,2007). 
129. [d. at 3. 
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state funding program for abstinence education that gave grants to a variety 
of groups that spent money to support prayer at pro-life marches and rallies 
and taught participants about '''the virgin birth and ... God's desire [for] 
sexual purity as a way of life. '" The groups also conducted public school 
skits that made statements "about what God and the Bible say about 
abstinence," and gave engraved Bibles to children. l3o The court concluded 
that state money was "being used to convey religious messages and advance 
religion.,,131 and ordered the state to implement safeguards that would 
prevent government abstinence funds from being used for religious 
purposes. 132 
These and other blatant violations of charitable choice restrictions have 
several causes. Obviously, the government is not doing an adequate job of 
monitoring its charitable choice grants. Moreover, the government is not 
providing grantees with a clear description of how charitable choice funds 
can be spent. Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle have lamented the 
government's failure to define what sorts of religious activity beyond 
worship and proselytizing are forbidden, thus leaving grantees in a legal 
limbo. 133 The regulations and guidance issued by the White House and 
federal agencies state that government may not directly support "inherently 
religious activities," such as "worship, religious instruction, or 
proselytizing.,,134 This statement is incomplete because it fails to recognize 
that religious indoctrination can occur when social services are "intertwined 
with the inculcation of religious beliefs." 135 Yet, even crystal clear 
regulations would not have prevented the activities conducted by the Silver 
Ring Thing or the Firm Foundation. Their activities purposely included 
worship and proselytizing, which are forbidden on the face of the statute. 
At bottom, the tensions within charitable choice between religiosity and 
neutrality may be irreconcilable.136 On the one hand, charitable choice is 
based on the premise that personal transformations achieved through the 
power of religion can solve social ills. 137 Accordingly, charitable choice 
attempts to preserve the spiritual character of religious groups, which is, 
after all, the supposed source of their effectiveness in delivering social 
130. American Civil Liberties Union v. Foster, 2002 WL 1733651, *3-6 (E.D. La. 2002). 
131. Id. at *7. 
132. [d. at *6-8. 
133. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 87, at 77. 
134. [d. at 85. 
135. [d. at 84. The authors also note that the Supreme Court has never used an "inherently 
religious" test in considering permissible church-state activities. [d. 
136. See FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at 174 ("[W)e seem to be faced here with 
a faith-based public policy that is inherently contradictory."). 
137. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
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services. 138 On the other hand, charitable choice can constitutionally fund 
only secular activities, thus precluding religious service providers from 
using religious content in their programs.139 It is hard to see how both 
objectives can be served simultaneously. Stripped of their religious content, 
the Silver Ring Thing and the Firm Foundation are simply social service 
programs delivered by employees who are moved by a higher power to help 
the needy. Yet this sort of motivation is not enough for proponents of 
charitable choice; they want program content to be imbued with religion.140 
Even in a compliant charitable choice program, a welfare beneficiary can 
receive services in a facility adorned with religious symbols and be invited 
to join a voluntary prayer session by a church employee-and indeed, this is 
happening. 141 Although local governments are supposed to provide 
alternative secular providers in the beneficiary's geographic area (which is 
often impossible in rural locales), it is not clear that needy individuals 
struggling with drug addiction, homelessness, domestic violence, mental 
illness, or other disabilities have the wherewithal to make such a request. 
Does charitable choice really erase the risk of involuntary religious 
indoctrination, which is unconstitutional under current law? Charitable 
choice raises profound constitutional questions with no easy answers. 
However, ten years of experience provide some evidence for considering 
whether charitable choice is more of a panacea or a peril. 
II. LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF CHARITABLE CHOICE 
Welfare reform has effectively reduced the welfare rolls; there are half 
as many people on welfare today as there were in 1996.142 Yet welfare 
reform has not eliminated poverty.143 Most former welfare recipients are 
working, but remain below the poverty line, while others are unemployed 
and disconnected from the welfare system. l44 These sobering results reflect 
138. See Thomas W. Ross, The Faith-Based Initiative: Anti-Poverty or Anti-Poor?, 9 GEO. J. 
ON POVERTY. L. & POL'y 167, 177 (2002) ("The [President's] Initiative's unstated but fundamental 
contention is that faith-based programs ought to command government funding because they 
influence the religious beliefs of clients."). 
139. See supra Part I.B (discussing the constitutional restrictions on charitable choice). 
140. See FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at 174 (the Bush Administration's 
"concept of life transformation seems to confirm the idea that religious worship, preaching, and 
proselytization are part of a successful program."). 
141. See Heidi Rolland Unruh & Jill Witmer Sinha, A Church-Based Welfare-to-Work 
Partnership, in SANCTIONING RELIGION?, supra note 13, at 69, 81; see also KRAMER ET AL., supra 
note 20, at 56-59,64 (describing religious content in charitable choice programs). 
142. THE URBAN INSTITUTE, A DECADE OF WELFARE REFORM: FACTS AND FIGURES, June 
2006, available at http://www.urban.org!UploadedPDF/900980_welfarereform.pdf. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
414 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [lO:2007] 
the fact that the drafters of welfare refonn were fixated on ending welfare 
dependency, rather than on fighting poverty.145 Achieving the latter goal 
would likely require more significant structural changes than welfare refonn 
offers, such as a better educational system, health care coverage for all 
Americans, universal child care, and improved employment opportunities. 146 
By contrast, charitable choice claims to offer religious transfonnation as a 
way of solving social ills. 147 
Yet moral and spiritual failings are not the root causes of either welfare 
dependency or poverty. This premise, put forward by charitable choice 
proponents such as President Bush, ignores the far more complicated causes 
of poverty, including decades of forced segregation, changes in urban 
economies, declines in labor market opportunities, the erosion of the 
minimum wage and low-wage income, deindustrlalization, globalization, the 
decline of unions, and the increased use of contingent workers who are low-
wage, part-time, and lack benefits. 148 The premise is also inaccurate; many 
welfare recipients are members of faith communities and do not fit the 
"profile of ... morally confused people.,,149 This emphasis on the morals of 
the poor is thus dangerous because it threatens to push responsibility for the 
poor onto private organizations and lets government off the hook from 
grappling with structural strategies that might more effectively combat the 
causes of poverty. 150 This rhetoric would not be as troubling if the actual 
implementation of charitable choice aided in reducing poverty. Accordingly, 
this Part assesses whether charitable choice is an effective strategy for 
bringing current and fonner welfare recipients out of poverty. In tum, this 
analysis sheds light on whether the constitutional risks of charitable choice 
are worth taking. 
145. Juliet Brodie, Post-Welfare Lawyering: Clinical Legal Education and a New Poverty 
Law Agenda, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 20 I, 213 (2006) ("Indeed, while ending "dependence" on 
welfare is among the legislative goals of [PRA], decreasing poverty is not."). 
146. See Weber, supra note 73, at 105--06 ("Many of the problems of those needing social 
services are such things as lack of affordable housing, an inadequate minimum wage, and 
understaffed agencies."). 
147. See, e.g., FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 84 (quoting the rhetoric of President Bush and 
former HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros). 
148. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling All of the People Some of the 
Time: 1990s Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of American Values, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 3, 
66-72 (\996); Joel F. Handler, "Ending Welfare as We Know It''-Wrongfor Welfare, Wrong for 
Poverty, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 10-13 (\994); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IMPROVING POOR 
PEOPLE 77-78 (1995). 
149. SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 265. 
150. See Ross, supra note 138, at 180. 
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A. Effectiveness 
Charitable choice assumes that a faith-based approach to human 
services is superior to a secular approach, but there is little empirical 
evidence to support this assumption. lSI Comparing the performance of 
secular and sectarian providers is a challenge in the highly decentralized 
human services environment. 152 Moreover, it is also difficult to quantify and 
measure performance-based outcomes for these services, which are intensely 
interpersonal. 153 For instance, in a job training program, is success measured 
by the number of recipients who obtain a part-time job? A full-time job? By 
the number of participants who keep a job for more than three months? Six 
months? A year? By the number of participants who obtain any job? Or a 
job with benefits? Measuring the impact of faith is further complicated 
because the religious content of faith-based programs varies across a wide 
spectrum;154 on one end are faith-based groups that do not mention religion 
at all, at the other end are those that explicitly make adherence to deeply 
religious content a condition of participation.155 In the absence of empirical 
evidence, the Bush Administration has touted anecdotal evidence about a 
few allegedly successful faith-based programs, and ignored horror stories 
from other programs. 156 Yet, the anecdotal evidence suggests that successful 
faith-based organizations cultivate intensive, long-term staff-client 
lSI. See FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at 172 ("There is no evidence that it will 
save money or be more effective in changing people's lives."); KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 14 
("There is no systematic evidence that the quality of services delivered by faith-based organizations 
is superior to the quality of services provided by other social service providers."). 
152. For the challenges inherent in studying charitable choice effectiveness, see SHEILA 
SUESS KENNEDY & WOLFGANG BIELEFELD, CHARITABLE CHOICE AT WORK 1-13 (2006). 
153. See SHEILA SUESS KENNEDY, CENTER FOR URBAN POLICY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 
CHARITABLE CHOICE: FIRST RESULTS FROM THREE STATES 57 (2003), available at http://ccr.urban 
center.iupui.edulPDFs/interim%20reportllnterim%20report%20PDF.pdf (noting the difficulties in 
drawing comparisons due to problems in measuring outcomes "where quality is not easily quantified 
and multiple objectives and constituencies frequently exist"). 
154. See generally Helen Rose Ebaugh et aI., Where's the Faith in Faith-Based 
Organizations? Measures and Correlates of Religiosity in Faith-Based Social Service Coalitions, 84 
SOC. FORCES 2259 (June 2006) (demonstrating that faith-based organizations vary widely in terms 
of service religiosity, staff religiosity, and organizational religiosity); see also KRAMER ET AL., supra 
note 20, at 67 (stating that the wide variety in program characteristics among faith-based 
organizations "are sufficiently broad to make consideration of FBOs as a class only minimally 
meaningful"). 
ISS. See ROBERT WUTHNOW, SAVING AMERICA: FAITH-BASED SERVICES AND THE FUTURE 
OF CIVIL SOCIETY 143 (2004). 
156. See Gilman, supra note 5, at 802-03; see also Mark A.R. Kleiman, Faith Based 
Fudging, How a Bush-promoted Christian Prison Program Fakes Success by Massaging Data, 
SLATE, Aug. 5, 2003, available at www.slate.com/idl2086617/ (explaining how a study of a Bible-
centered prison program misrepresented outcomes by engaging in selection bias). 
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relationships with a strong religious overlay.IS7 This sort of explicit, overt 
religious content, however, is forbidden under charitable choice. 158 It may be 
a desirable way to spend private dollars, but it is impermissible with public 
funds. 
Moreover, while anecdotal "claims about the success of particular faith-
based programs are widespread . . . there is typically no control group for 
comparison.,,159 Even where a control group is used, the data is often 
misleading. For instance, President Bush often points to the success of the 
InnerChange Freedom Initiative, the same evangelical, in-prison 
rehabilitation program that a federal district court judge in Iowa recently 
found unconstitutional. 160 InnerChange "encourages inmates to tum from 
their sinful past, see the world through God's eyes, and surrender to God's 
will. This model promotes the transformation of the inmate from the inside 
out through the miraculous power of God's love.,,161 A prominent and oft-
touted 2003 study of InnerChange found that recidivism rates for the 
InnerChange offenders were significantly lower than for prisoners who did 
not take part in the program. 162 However, the study only considered success 
rates for graduates and did not take into account that over half the 
InnerChange participants did not complete the program because they were 
released from prison, dropped out, or were expelled. 163 When these non-
graduating participants were factored into the data, the differences between 
the InnerChange participants and the comparison groups evaporated, with 
the Innerchange participants actually faring slightly worse in terms of 
recidivism. 164 
A major study by the non-partisan Center for Urban Policy and the 
Environment compared the performance of faith-based and secular entities 
delivering job training and placement services to welfare recipients in 
Indiana pursuant to the T ANF statute. 165 The preliminary findings of the 
researchers were that faith-based job training and placement services "were 
157. See WUTHNOW, supra note 155, at 160--61. 
158. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j) (2000). 
159. See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 15 (noting that there is a selection bias in faith-
based interventions, stating "those who choose to participate in faith-based programs and those who 
stay in such programs may have an explicit affinity to the religious or spiritual grounding of the 
intervention"). 
160. See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text. 
161. The Innerchange Freedom Initiative, http://www.ifiprison.orgiprogram_Details/ 
A Tranf.ModeIl generic.asp?ID=969 (last visited Feb. 21, 2007). 
162. KENNEDY & BIELEFELD, supra note 152, at 30. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 153. 
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somewhat less effective that those of secular organizations.,,166 While both 
faith-based and secular providers were able to put welfare recipients in jobs 
at the same placement rates and at similar hourly wages, the clients of the 
faith-based providers worked substantially fewer hours per week and were 
less likely to have health insurance. 167 The study, however, does not shed 
light on other forms of social service provisions. Another study of Los 
Angeles welfare-to-work programs found that no type of provider-
governmental, non-profit, or religious-was superior or inferior to others. 168 
Each type of program had certain advantages. 169 For-profit providers had the 
highest placement rates, government programs had employees who were 
particularly helpful, and faith-based organizations and other non-profits were 
perceived as most empathetic by clients. 170 
While most researchers agree that faith-based organizations bring 
unique attributes to the human services field due to their strong community 
ties, 17l there is no evidence that these attributes can be harnessed to create 
better outcomes or that these benefits cannot be realized when churches set 
up religiously affiliated non-profits. 
B. Limited Congregational Capacity 
Charitable choice seeks to "level the playing field" by opening up 
government grant opportunities to religious organizations. 172 In particular, 
the government is seeking to include congregations within charitable choice 
initiatives. 173 Yet the evidence suggests that congregations are ill-suited to 
playa meaningful role in human services delivery. In the leading analysis of 
congregational activity, Professor Mark Chaves examined data from the 
National Congregations Study and concluded that charitable choice is 
166. Id. at iv. 
167. Id. 
168. See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 14. 
169. See id. at 14-15. 
170. See id. 
171. See id. at 41. 
172. See Steven K. Green, A Legacy of Discrimination? The Rhetoric and Reality of the 
Faith-Based Initiative: Oregon as a Case Study, 84 OR. L. REv. 724, 730 (2005) (discussing the 
Bush Administration's claim that religious organizations are discriminated against in government 
funding programs). 
173. See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 8-10, 121; U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv., 
Admin. for Children and Families, Compassion Capital Fund, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ccf/ 
(providing information about the fund and listing grant opportunities); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVE: IMPROVEMENTS IN MONITORING GRANTEES 
AND MEASURING PERFORMANCE COULD ENHANCE ACCOUNTABILITY 22 (2006), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d06616.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report]. 
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unlikely to alter existing patterns of congregational involvement in social 
services. 174 Although a majority of congregations are involved in social 
service activities, these activities constitute a peripheral aspect of 
congregational life. 175 Only 6% of all congregations report that they have a 
staff person who devotes at least 25% of his or her time to social services, 
and congregations spend a median average of 3% of their total budgets, or 
$1200, on social service programs.176 Most charitable efforts are 
spearheaded by a tiny, dedicated core of volunteers within a congregation. 177 
Thus, congregations are best suited to organizing small groups to perform 
discrete tasks.178 As a result, most congregational activity focuses on 
assisting with emergency needs of the poor for food, clothing, and shelter, 
"rather than in programs requiring more sustained and personal involvement 
to meet longer-term needs, such as programs in the areas of health, 
education ... , domestic violence, substance abuse, tutoring or mentoring, 
and work or employment." 179 Detailed jurisdictional studies from 
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Indianapolis confirm Chaves' findings and 
conclude that welfare reform is not spurring congregations to develop social 
service programs. 180 
Moreover, congregations do not deliver these discrete social services in 
a particularly holistic or transformational way. Rather, services are provided 
with only minimal, short-term contact with the needy, thus undercutting 
claims that churches develop long-term connections with service recipients 
that integrate the needy into faith communities. 181 While many 
congregations are focused on moral uplift of their members, in-depth studies 
reveal that congregational services do not transfer morals to non-member 
clients who receive social services, in part due to differences in class and 
race between church members and clients. 182 Moreover, comparisons of 
secular and sectarian providers demonstrate that religious groups are no 
174. See MARK CHAVES, CONGREGATIONS IN AMERICA 7 (2004). This study is considered 
the "gold standard" in tenus of research of congregational activity because of its comprehensiveness, 
although it may underestimate the amount of social services provided by congregations. See 
WUTHNOW, supra note 155, at 38-41. 
175. See CHAVES, supra note 174, at 47-50 (noting the "peripheral nature of social services 
for most congregations"). 
176. See id. at 50. 
177. See id. at 55. 
178. See id. at 290. 
179. [d. at 47, 59-{i0; see also KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 10-14 (summarizing 
studies). 
180. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 291 (discussing Wisconsin and Pennsylvania); 
FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 55 (discussing Indianapolis). 
18 \. See CHAVES, supra note 174, at 59-{)0. 
182. See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 85, 92-93. 
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more or less likely to utilize holistic strategies in aiding clients. I 83 And "even 
when congregations set out to provide more holistic care, those efforts often 
flounder on the rocky shore of social boundaries and complex realities" that 
shape the lives of the poor. 184 
Most congregational social service activity is done in collaboration with 
other organizations, ranging from other churches to secular non-profits to 
government agencies. 185 A typical example is a church that provides 
volunteers for a soup kitchen where the food comes from a secular food 
bank and a publicly funded cook prepares the food. 186 Due to resource 
constraints, congregations are more likely to run food pantries than soup 
kitchens; when they cannot afford to provide services themselves, they will 
often collaborate with other groupS.187 Therefore, rather than being a 
freestanding alternative to secular providers, this pattern of collaboration 
demonstrates that "congregation-based social services often are integrated 
into community social welfare systems.,,188 In sum, research on 
congregations shows that churches play an integral and important role in 
meeting discrete, immediate needs within their communities, as well as in 
collaborating with professionalized service providers. However, 
congregations generally lack either the resources or desire to engage in more 
complex forms of social service delivery. 
Although well-meaning, congregations that have pursued larger 
ambitions have often faltered. 189 For instance, the Faith and Families 
program in Mississippi was received with great fanfare on the national stage 
when Governor Fordice announced that the state would link welfare 
recipients with congregations, who were to serve as mentors. 190 The 
183. See CHAVES, supra note 174, at 63-64. 
184. Id. at 63. 
185. See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 68 (congregations are "more likely to serve as points 
of access and referral for public and private agencies offering health, human services, and other 
forms of assistance"); WUTHNOW, supra note 155, at 100. Collaboration is most likely among large, 
mainline-Protestant, theologically liberal congregations and least likely among evangelical 
congregations. See CHAVES, supra note 174, at 69. African-American churches are most likely to 
collaborate with secular groups. Id. 
186. See CHA YES, supra note 174, at 70. 
187. See RAM A. CNAAN, THE INVISIBLE CARING HAND: AMERICAN CONGREGATIONS AND 
THE PROVISION OF WELFARE 71 (2002). 
188. Id. at 73. These collaborations neither discourage a holistic approach, as conservatives 
fear, nor dampen congregations' political activism, as liberals fear. Id. at 92. See also WUTHNOW, 
supra note 155, at 61 ("Congregations are more likely, it appears, to help other organizations supply 
services than to invest heavily in organizing formal programs of their own."). 
189. See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 69 ("There is an abundance of evidence that 
congregations have difficulty sustaining community development or delivering social welfare 
services."). 
190. Id. 
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adoptive churches were expected to provide material resources, such as job 
training, as well as moral guidance in the hopes of moving welfare recipients 
toward self-sufficiency. 191 Yet in the first two and half years of the program, 
only ninety-eight families volunteered for the program and of these, only 
twenty-one families were able to leave welfare. 192 The program was 
eventually terminated. 193 Reflecting on the program, one scholar explains 
that the congregations simply did not have the ability to "sustain ongoing, 
effective assistance for the families they adopt.,,194 Poor families face a bevy 
of interrelated problems that the average congregation could not handle 
while also meeting the spiritual needs of its members. 195 
Furthermore, it is not clear that congregations are needed to level the 
human services playing field. Indeed, the "unlevel playing field" analogy is 
misleading because the pre-charitable choice federal procurement system for 
social services did not discriminate against faith-based providers. 196 From 
the founding of this country, governments and religious groups have had an 
intertwined, and often collaborative, relationship in providing social 
welfare. 197 During the twentieth century, governments at all levels 
extensively funded religiously affiliated nonprofit groups to deliver services 
to the needy.198 For instance, in 1993, government funding accounted for 
92% of the budget of Lutheran Social Ministries, 65% of Catholic Charities, 
and 75% of the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services. '99 This 
historic pattern of interrelationships between government and faith-based 
organizations spurred one charitable choice proponent to remark, even prior 
to the enactment of the PRA, "when it comes to public money and religious 
nonprofit organizations, sacred and secular mix.,,2oo 
191. See JOHN P. BARTKOWSKI & HELEN A. REGIS, CHARITABLE CHOICES: RELIGION, RACE, 
AND POVERTY IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA 173 (2003). 
192. See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 70. 
193. Explanations for the demise of the program vary. See BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra 
note 191, at 63. 
194. FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 70. 
195. See id. 
196. See Green, supra note 160, at 753-61. 
197. LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN'PUBLIC SERVICE: GoVERNMENT-NONPROFIT 
RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 33-34 (\995). 
198. See Green, supra note 160, at 754--57. 
199. [d. at 1. Religious groups created these separate affiliates to be eligible for government 
social service funds, because governing Supreme Court caselaw until the mid-1990s stated that 
government could not fund "pervasively sectarian" organizations. See infra notes 82-92 and 
accompanying text. While these affiliated organizations were built upon a religious motivation to 
provide social services, they did so in a more secular environment. See Ryden and Polet, supra note 
\3, at 1-2. 
200. [d. at I; see also KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 3, 40 ("Many faith-based social 
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As far back as 1899, the Supreme Court upheld a congressional 
appropriation for construction of a Catholic hospital, reasoning that the 
hospital provided secular services.201 In 1988, in Bowen v. Kendrick, the 
Supreme Court upheld a federal grant program that funded religious 
organizations, among others, to counsel pregnant teenagers, while 
prohibiting abortion-related services or information.202 As these cases 
demonstrate, there has never been an outright ban on the participation of 
religiously-affiliated organizations in federal grant programs. A major pre-
1996 study of faith-based contracting at the state and local level found that 
local governmental officials "welcomed the participation of faith-based 
organizations.,,203 The study "found little indication that public officials 
were hostile to [faith based organizations]" and there were no "allegations 
from the [faith based organizations] about past or present ill treatment.,,204 
Thus, claims of anti-religious discrimination are overstated and fail to 
distinguish between churches and affiliates of religious organizations, who 
have long been eligible to apply for federal grants.205 Although most 
congregations have limited administrative capacity for complex human 
services grants, there are many highly professional religiously affiliated 
organizations that can deliver these services. Thus, there is little warrant for 
spending millions of dollars to increase the technical and administrative 
capacity of congregations to battle over an ever-decreasing slice of the 
federal social service pie. 
C. Accountability 
The charitable choice statute provides that religious organizations are 
subject to the same regulations as other contractors "to account in accord 
with generally accepted auditing principles for the use of such funds.,,206 
However, this narrow accountability requirement is not sufficient to ensure 
that religious grantees deliver on their contractual obligations or maintain 
the legally required separation between religious practices and service 
delivery.207 Current research shows that congregational leaders and staff lack 
the knowledge and competence to understand the complicated constitutional 
service organizations contracted with government long before Charitable Choice and continue to do 
so."). 
201. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297-300 (1899). 
202. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 589. 
203. See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 4. 
204. [d. 
205. See Green, supra note 172, at 755-56. 
206. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(h) (2000). 
207. See Gilman, supra note 5, at 853 (explaining the narrowness of this provision). 
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restnctIons on the use of government funds. 208 For instance, a survey of 
congregational leaders revealed that sixty-seven percent did not know that 
they were prohibited from using their government funds for religious 
activities such as prayer or bible study.209 For its part, the government is not 
doing enough to educate congregations about their rights and 
responsibilities. According to a recent report by the General Accounting 
Office (GAO), almost all the federal agencies studied told grantees that they 
were not permitted to spend money on "inherently religious activities," but 
less than half of the agencies informed grantees about the rights of program 
beneficiaries or provided them with information about permissible hiring 
practices.21O Not surprisingly then, four of the thirteen faith-based 
organizations that provided voluntary religious activities such as prayer did 
not separate them in either time or location from the federally-funded 
services.21l The GAO further found that most federal agencies are not 
monitoring contracts to see whether grantees are complying with 
constitutional safeguards or standards that protect beneficiaries from 
discrimination.212 Moreover, the single audit required by the statute does not 
include checks for these safeguards,213 and site visits to grantee programs are 
rare.214 The "bewildering variety and complexity" of faith-based 
organizations can make it difficult for government to devise regulatory 
oversight mechanisms,215 suggesting further that accountability is much 
tougher to ensure than charitable choice drafters envisioned. 
While the federal government struggles with maintammg 
accountability, many congregations struggle as well because they are 
unprepared to deal with the requirements of government procurement 
processes. Unlike highly regarded non-profits such as Catholic Charities and 
the Salvation Army, which are widely seen as some of the most effective 
community-based organizations in the country,216 most congregations have 
neither adequate staff nor the capacity for the data management and 
208. See KENNEDY & BIELEFELD, supra note 152, at iv. 
209. See id. at v. 
210. See GAO Report, supra note 173, at 29; see also KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 60-
62 (documenting that beneficiaries are not being notified of their right to seek services from an 
alternate provider). 
211. See GAO Report, supra note 173, at 34. 
212. ld.at29. 
213. See id. at 29, 36. 
214. Seeid.at37. 
215. PETER DOBKIN HALL, ACCOUNTABILITY IN FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS AND THE 
FUTURE OF CHARITABLE CHOICE II (2002), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edui 
-phalli ARNOV A-FBOO/020ACCOUNT ABILITY.pdf. 
216. See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 68. 
Fighting Poverty with Faith 423 
reporting that are required to meet government accountability 
mechanisms.217 Congregations focus on a religious mission and generally 
lack the accoutrements of professional management, such as staffing, office 
space and technology, planning, and administrative competence.218 Clergy 
are generally not trained in administration, and churches often rely on lay 
volunteers for accounting because they cannot afford professional financial 
services.219 This limited capacity is why so many congregations tum to 
established nonprofits when they are seeking services for the needy.22o 
While some larger churches can amass the resources to be effective partners 
in government procurement, "the reality of the situation is that most 
congregations are much too small to have a broad impact and are too small, 
even, to write the grant applications or leverage the funds necessary to 
compete in the public or foundation funding arena.,,221 Charitable choice 
may reinforce racial and class inequality because some smaller 
congregations, as well as denominations headed by part-time clergy, cannot 
compete effectively for grants.222 For example, researchers in Mississippi 
found that bi-vocational ministers are concentrated in black churches that 
have low-income membership.223 Such churches are disadvantaged in 
applying for and managing government contracts. 
Although President Bush is pushing millions of dollars toward building 
the technical capacity of small, faith-based groups such as congregations, 
there is still reluctance on the part of some churches to avail themselves of 
these funds because of their own awareness of capacity limitations and 
concerns about government entanglement with their religious beliefs.224 In 
addition, some churches fear that data collection and performance 
measurement will impersonalize the service they provide, as well as work to 
stigmatize beneficiaries by singling them out for data collection.225 At 
bottom, the contractual norms of charitable choice that aim to protect 
217. See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 42-43. 
218. See WUTHNOW, supra note ISS, at III (noting that when non-profits got involved in 
government contracting, there ensued "a revolution in nonprofit management, producing a 
pronounced shift in power from boards and volunteers to cadres of paid professionally-trained 
staff'); KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 42 (Small FBOs "lack sophisticated organizational and 
financial structures, including adequate policies regarding governing boards, financial record 
keeping, and fundraising and employment practices."). 
219. See WUTHNOW, supra note ISS, at III. 
220. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 308. 
221. FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 74. 
222. See BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 191, at 173. 
223. Seeid.at 173-74. 
224. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 293 ("Most congregations have neither the 
administrative capacity nor the inclination to serve as social service agencies."). 
225. See BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 191, at 164. 
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beneficiaries and ensure quality services tend to conflict with the 
"covenantal impetus and moral bases" that underlie church outreach to the 
poor.226 As one commentator summarizes, "Working within a ministry, a 
religious group is accountable only to God; working under contract 
inevitably subjects faith communities to oversight and monitoring that may 
compromise not only their beliefs, but their constitutional freedoms.,,227 
Charitable choice resolves the tension between religious freedom and 
contractual accountability by erring on the side of non-entanglement. The 
law has long shielded religious organizations from government intrusion so 
as to promote the free exercise of religion and to avoid the government 
establishment of religion.228 Thus, lawmakers and courts tread lightly where 
religious groups are involved, treating religious groups "as nearly sovereign 
entities.,,229 For instance, as a matter of state corporate law, churches 
generally have greater freedom than other nonprofits to structure their 
organizational form, and they are subject to less oversight from state 
agencies, even though they obtain identical tax benefits as other 
nonprofits.230 Similarly, churches are awarded automatic tax-exempt status 
from the IRS.231 They not only can forgo the tax-exempt application, but 
also do not have to go through the annual reporting required from secular 
nonprofits, which provides the public with valuable information about the 
sources of the nonprofit's financial support; net assets; the breakdown of 
expenses between fundraising, management, and program expenditures; staff 
salaries; and program activities.232 
Moreover, the tort liability of religious organizations is more limited 
than that of other non-profits, which already have substantial protections 
against lawsuits.233 The Supreme Court has long held that the First 
Amendment bars courts from adjudicating religious questions.234 As a result, 
courts cannot inquire into the validity of religious beliefs, they cannot 
independently interpret religious texts, and they cannot examine the internal 
226. Id. at 171. 
227. WUTHNOW, supra note ISS, at 112. 
228. See generally Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline oj 
Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. LJ. 219 (2000). 
229. See HALL, supra note 215, at 3. 
230. See Gilman, supra note 5, at 838. 
231. I.R.C. §§ 501(a), (c)(3) and 508(a), (c)(I)(A). 
232. IRS, Dep't of Treas., Instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ (2006), available at 
http;llwww.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990-ez.pef. For the benefits of the Form 990 in maintaining non-
profit accountability, see generally Peter Swords, The Form 990 as an Accountability Tool Jor 
501(c)(3) Nonprojits, 51 TAX LAW. 571 (1998). 
233. See Idleman, supra note 228, at 220-27. 
234. See id. at 220-27 (describing caselaw). 
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decision-making of religious entities.235 The reluctance of courts to interfere 
with religious practices has resulted in many courts dismissing tort claims 
against churches and clergy, such as breach of fiduciary duty, negligent 
hiring and supervision, tortious interference with contract, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and defamation.236 
In addition to the protection from lawsuits, many states exempt 
religious groups not only from taxation, but also from licensing and 
inspection requirements that apply to other non-profits.237 For instance, in 
eleven states, non-profit secular day care centers must comply with a bevy of 
detailed regulations about staff-child ratios, cleanliness, safety, academic 
programming, and other quality of care standards, while day care centers at 
churches are free to ignore most, if not all, of these requirements.238 Since 
1989, congressional legislation has provided religious groups with more than 
200 exemptions or special arrangements not available to other non-profits or 
for-profit businesses in areas ranging from immigration to land use to 
pensions.239 For welfare recipients, this hands-off approach risks placing 
them in the hands of religious groups that lack the skills, training, or 
competence to deliver social services, while denying them any avenues for 
recourse. 
All of these doctrines, designed to promote the free exercise of religion, 
shield religious groups from public scrutiny. In tum, this inadvertently 
defeats external attempts to keep congregations accountable to the public for 
the money they are spending to deliver social services.24o When religious 
groups are operating in the private sphere, their members, donors, and 
service recipients generally have a choice whether or not to associate with 
the organization, and these various constituents can disengage for any 
reason.241 Yet when a religious group is delivering federally funded social 
services, taxpayers and beneficiaries do not always have the choice to opt 
out. Particularly given the capacity limitations of many congregations, 
accountability mechanisms should be more rigorous for these groups, yet, 
current practice is to the contrary. 
235. /d. 
236. See Gilman, supra note 5, at 840--42. 
237. See Diana B. Henriques, As Exemptions Grow, Religion Outweighs Regulation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A I. 
238. [d. Texas dropped the exemption for daycare centers established when President Bush 
was Governor because there was ten times the rate of abuse and neglect cases at the unlicensed, 
sectarian facilities. /d. 
239. [d. 
240. See Gilman, supra note 5, at 822-23. 
241. [d. at 839. 
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III. CONGREGATIONS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Although most congregations lack the capacity to deliver 
comprehensive social services, they still have much to offer government in 
fighting poverty because of the pivotal role they play within communities 
and for their members. Scholars who study religion have focused 
increasingly on the concept of social capitaI,242 which consists of "social 
relationships based on trust that have value or can be used productively.,,243 
Although it is difficult to generalize across the vast diversity of 
congregational life in the United States,244 congregations generally share one 
feature-they are valuable reservoirs of social capital. Social capital is 
grouped into two categories: bonding and bridging.245 Bonding capital is 
"inward looking" and happens within social groups.246 Within 
congregations, bonding capital develops from communal worship, shared 
religious norms, social support, and mutual aid to members.247 By contrast, 
bridging social capital is "outward looking," and develops when groups that 
do not necessarily share the same cultural background or common identity 
forge on-going relationships of truSt.248 For instance, many congregations 
collaborate with other religious groups, community organizations, and 
governmental agencies in social service programs to help the needy.249 Also, 
in many low-income communities, churches provide personal connections, 
mentoring relationships, and leadership opportunities for members that serve 
as a bridge to the "wider world of work and social service.,,25o This Part 
explores the social capital within the black church.25I Although this Part 
242. See BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 191, at 18. 
243. SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 9. 
244. Congregations range from megachurches to small storefront churches; from 
fundamentalist to liberal denominations. See CNAAN, supra note 187, at 101. 
245. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 11-12. 
246. BARTOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 222, at 19. 
247. See id. at 19; CNAAN, supra note 187, at 261. 
248. See BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 191, at 19. 
249. See CNAAN, supra note 187, at 71,141,261. 
250. SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 266. Congregations are often the local organizations 
with the longest history in the neighborhood, they have a tradition of helping those in need, and they 
can mobilize volunteers. See F ARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 108. 
251. Although this Article focuses on the social capital within the black church, it is 
important to note that congregations playa similarly important role in other minority neighborhoods 
and in rural areas. See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 41; Melanie D. Acevedo, Note, Client 
Choices, Community Values: Why Faith-Based Legal Services Providers are Good/or Poverty Law, 
70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1491, 1529-30 (2002) ("Poor communities, particularly urban communities of 
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highlights some limits inherent within social capital, it concludes that 
churches can be valuable partners to government in fighting poverty. Most 
importantly, congregations are reservoirs of moral legitimacy, and they are 
already important partners in social service networks.252 
A. The Black Church 
An examination of the social capital within urban, African-American 
churches in low-income communities is particularly useful in illustrating the 
two forms of social capital and how they can contribute to a more effective 
welfare system. Also, urban African-American neighborhoods are focal 
points for welfare reform efforts because they are disproportionately poor.253 
Leading religion scholars Eric Lincoln and Lawrence Mamiya have stated 
that "[t]he black church has no challenger as the cultural womb of the black 
community.,,254 This is especially true in poor, inner-city neighborhoods 
where churches are often the only viable social institutions.255 The Bush 
Administration has targeted black churches by encouraging them to engage 
color, do, in fact, value their faith institutions. Within the African American and Latino 
communities, the church, and increasingly, the mosque, is the center of the social and political, as 
well as spiritual, activity of the community."). 
252. See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 77. 
253. See Ruth McCoy, Expedited Permanency: Implications for African-American Children 
and Families, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 475, 478 (2005) ("African-American families have been 
disproportionately impacted by both the 1961 and 1996 welfare legislation because they comprise a 
disproportionate amount of the impoverished families in the United States."). At the same time, it is 
important to recognize that much of welfare reform was fueled by racist images of urban African 
Americans, particularly women. See Peter Edelman, Welfare and the Politics of Race: Same Tune. 
New Lyrics?, II GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 389, 392-93 (2004) ("Inner-city African-
American families never constituted more than twenty percent of all the people on welfare. They 
never even constituted a majority of African-Americans on welfare. Yet the politicized stereotype of 
the typical welfare recipient-the image that millions of Americans carried in their minds-was that 
of a never-married inner-city African-American woman who kept getting pregnant in order to get a 
bigger welfare check. Factually incorrect. Demonstrably. Never mind that the racially driven 
backlash against welfare would hurt more non-blacks than blacks; nevertheless, a racially connected 
anti-welfare politics began to take hold."). 
254. C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 8 (1990). The term "black church" is used as a "term of art for expressing 
the centrality of Black churches in Black communities." Michele M. SimmsParris, What Does It 
Mean to See a Black Church Burning?: Understanding the Significance of Constitution ali zing Hate 
Speech, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 127, 131 (1998). Nevertheless, there are "innumerable differences" in 
black churches in America that arise from denominational affiliations, political philosophies, 
geographical location, surrounding communities, and other social differences.ld. at 131-32. 
255. See R. Khari Brown & Ronald E. Brown, Faith and Works: Church-Based Social 
Capital Resources and African American Political Activism, 82 Soc. FORCES 617 (2003) ("Churches 
are often the only nongovernmental institution in black communities."). 
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in charitable choice programs,256 and as a result, the black church must 
confront the benefits and detriments of accepting government funding.257 
The history of the black church has its roots in slavery.258 Religion not 
only aided black Americans in coping with slavery and racial segregation, 
but it was the only "stable and coherent" social institution that emerged 
against the strictures of extreme racism.259 Although religion was imposed 
on slaves by their masters, slaves also held secret, independent religious 
gatherings that resisted white culture and laid the foundation for the black 
church.26o Post-emancipation, mutual aid societies and churches were the 
first social institutions that free blacks created.26I In the mid to late 
Nineteenth Century, black churches developed a "civic tradition that 
nurtures a sense of charity for the poor and an active engagement in political 
life. ,,262 Churches became the center of black life, and they were the 
"incubator behind schools, business enterprises, charity, politics, and 
recreation.,,263 In the early twentieth century, urban churches absorbed and 
helped acclimate thousands of migrants from the rural South.264 
In the 1960s, the black church was the anchor of the Civil Rights 
Movement.265 Black clergy were instrumental in the movement, and black 
churches provided meeting space, a mobilized base of supporters, and 
financial support.266 In the post-civil rights era, most black churches agreed 
that they needed to be engaged in both community outreach and political 
256. See Frank A. Pryor III & David K. Ryden, Serving the Inner City: Social Programs in 
Black Churches, in SANCTIONING RELIGION?, supra note 13, at 131. 
257. See generally Fredrick C. Harris, Black Churches and Civic Traditions: Outreach, 
Activism, and the Politics of Public Funding of Faith-Based Ministries, in CAN CHARITABLE CHOICE 
WORK? COVERING RELIGION'S IMPACT ON URBAN AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL SERVICES 240, 240 
(Andrew Walsh ed., 2001). 
258. See LINCOLN & MAMIY A, supra note 254, at 7, 92-93. 
259. Id. 
260. See SimmsParris, supra note 254, at 135-38. 
261. See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 254, at 8. 
262. See Harris, supra note 257, at 140. 
263. Id. at 142. 
264. See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 254, at 119-23. Although most churches were too 
financially strained by mortgage obligations on church property to offer significant community 
outreach programs, churches were active in publicly denouncing racially motivated violence against 
blacks. !d. at 120-21; Harris, supra note 257, at 143; SimmsParris, supra note 254, at 138. Several 
prominent large churches did have major social service initiatives during this time. 
265. See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 254, at 211-12. 
266. See id. at 165; Harris, supra note 257, at 144-45. Not all black churches supported the 
movement; nevertheless, the black churches that were involved served as the "institutional center" 
for mobilization. See SimmsParris, supra note 254, at 138. 
Fighting Poverty with Faith 429 
matters, although they differed about how to achieve these goals.267 In short, 
throughout American history, the black church has provided "opportunities 
for participation, leadership, and cultural expression in a society where few 
other such opportunities were available."268 Despite denominational, 
doctrinal, and cultural differences across the broad spectrum of black 
congregations,269 the black church collectively offers social structure in 
addition to spiritual solace and thus continues to occupy "an unparalleled 
position as a foundational social institution in the African American 
community.,,27o For all these reasons, the black church has been called a 
"nation within a nation.,,271 
Today, in low-income African-American communities, the black 
church is not only a spiritual center but also continues to serve as the "base 
community for recreation, career matters, and many other aspects of daily 
life."272 Bonding social capital is generated by concerted efforts at 
community building--congregants actively recruit new members, offer 
social events, take an interest in the personal welfare of fellow members, and 
offer assistance to needy members.273 These churches also create bridging 
social capital. A study by Joanne Schneider of welfare reform in Wisconsin 
and Pennsylvania found that African-American churches serving low-
income communities helped members adapt to norms of white, middle-class 
social and work environments, which, in tum, helped members obtain and 
keep jobs.274 Many black churches offer their members leadership roles that 
exceed the responsibilities of their paid work. 275 In tum, these skills propel 
members into roles within the wider community.276 These churches are thus 
a source of empowerment and change for their members.277 Studies further 
establish that black churches are more likely than white churches to teach 
civic skills, foster political participation, and provide social services for their 
267. See Harris, supra note 257, at 140. 
268. Nancy T. Ammennan, Still Gathering After All These Years: Congregations in U.S. 
Cities, in CAN CHARITABLE CHOICE WORK?, supra note 257, at 8. 
269. See SimmsParris, supra note 254, at 133. 
270. Pryor & Ryden, supra note 256, at 131. 
271. See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 254, at 8 (quoting E. Franklin Frazier). 
272. SCHNEIDER, supra n~te 108, at 268. 
273. See id. at 268-69. 
274. See id. at 266, 270. 
275. Id. at 274. Congregations are places where people learn "organizational, bureaucratic, 
and leadership skills." FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 3. 
276. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 274. 
277. Id. at 293-94. 
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members. 278 In many inner-city churches, a majority of members commute 
from more affluent neighborhoods, and the financial and social resources of 
these members allow such congregations to have active social service 
programs.279 
The "bridging" social capital developed by black churches benefits not 
only members, but also poor non-members within the geographic 
community. Black churches are "significantly more involved than their 
white counterparts in providing programs for the pOOr.,,280 Almost all black 
churches have some sort of social outreach ministry; the majority of 
programs focus on youth, food and clothing banks, and prison ministries.z81 
Moreover, many churches serve a valuable role in connecting the needy to 
available social services outside the congregation.282 The bridging social 
capital of black churches goes beyond their immediate neighborhoods; black 
churches are also central to urban cities and are more likely than white 
churches to be actively engaged in urban politics and community economic 
development. 283 The clergy of large black churches often serve as a moral 
voice for the city as a whole,284 and the black church has launched the 
careers of many civic and politicalleaders.285 
Perhaps as a result of the centrality of the black church in the lives of 
African Americans, they are the most religious group of citizens within the 
United States. 286 Surveys show that 82% of African Americans belong to a 
church, versus 67% of whites.287 Similarly, 82% of African Americans say 
religion is "very important in their life," as compared to 55% of whites.288 
African Americans also see churches as the most important institution for 
278. See CNAAN, supra note 187, at 100, 110, 262. 
279. See Amrnennan, supra note 268, at 8. Members of black churches are less likely than 
other church members to live in the neighborhood where their church is located. See FARNSLEY, 
supra note 14, at 52. In Indianapolis, only thirty-six percent of black church members lived in the 
neighborhood. Id. Thus, one cannot assume that black churches are neighborhood churches. Id. 
280. Pryor & Ryden, supra note 256, at 132. 
281. DAVID A. BOSITIS, BLACK CHURCHES AND THE FAITH-BASED INITIATIVE, JOINT 
CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES 7 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.joint 
center.org/publications I /publication-PDFslF AITH3 .pdf. 
282. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 291; CNAAN, supra note 187, at 66,294 (churches 
serve as brokers between service system and local residents). 
283. See Amrnennan, supra note 268, at 8. Black churches are more involved in community 
development (twenty-two percent) than other churches. [d. at 18. 
284. See id. at 8. 
285. See Kelly Brown Douglas & Ronald E. Hopson, Understanding the Black Church: The 
Dynamics o/Change, 2 J. RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 95,99 (2001). 
286. See Pryor & Ryden, supra note 256, at 131. 
287. See id. 
288. See id. 
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alleviating social problems in black communities.289 Not surprisingly, 
African Americans are also more interested than whites in partnering with 
government to solve social problems; 64% of African Americans support the 
idea, versus 28% of whites.29o However, the extent and form of such a 
partnership is controversial within the black community.291 
While a majority of black clergy view charitable choice as a good 
match for the "historically rich activism of black churches," others fear that 
partnerships with government will dilute the political activism and moral 
authority of the black church.292 In general, more theologically liberal 
congregations, as well as black civil rights organizations oppose charitable 
choice, while more conservative denominations welcome the outreach of the 
Bush Administration.293 Some black leaders are suspicious of President 
Bush's attention, fearing that the initiative is designed to woo black voters to 
the Republican Party as well as a cover for the cutbacks in federal funds 
available for public assistance.294 There are also concerns that charitable 
choice will be used as tool for political patronage that could corrupt black 
communities "by rewarding contracts to activist ministers and churches who 
might be lured into accepting contracts in exchange for their support of 
political campaigns or policy initiatives.,,295 In short, black church leaders 
are well aware that they have substantial social capital to contribute to 
welfare programs, but they are tom on whether to put that capital at the 
service of the federal government. 
Black clergy are also concerned about the capacity constraints that face 
their congregations. A nationwide survey of black church clergy found that 
only three percent of black churches are engaged in charitable choice 
programs.296 Although three-quarters of black ministers are aware of 
charitable choice, fewer than one in three had a detailed understanding of the 
289. See Brown & Brown, supra note 255, at 618 (2003). 
290. See Pryor & Ryden, supra note 256, at 132. 
291. See id. at 139. 
292. Id. at 129. Black congregations are more likely than other congregations to be willing to 
apply for public funding. See Michael Leo Owens, Which Congregations Will Take Advantage of 
Charitable Choice? Explaining the Pursuit of Public Funding by Congregations, 87 Soc. SCI. Q. 55, 
70 (2006); Bositis, supra note 281, at 4. 
293. See Pryor & Ryden, supra note 256, at 134. 
294. See id. at 133-34. 
295. Harris, supra note 257, at 154. These fears have not been borne out by the evidence. 
Data shows that theologically liberal black congregations in traditionally Democratic states 
constitute the majority of charitable choice grant recipients among black churches. Bositis, supra 
note 281, at 6. 
296. The number may actually be somewhere between three and eleven percent because 
many churches that receive government grants through state and local governments are not aware 
that they are receiving federal funds that pass through local governments. See Bositis, supra note 
281, at 5. 
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President's initiative or had spoken with a lawyer or accountant about the 
program's requirements.297 Only one out of nine black churches had applied 
for a charitable choice grant, and applicants were generally larger churches 
with higher revenues and a liberal theology.298 Thirty-one percent of black 
church applicants were awarded funds, and these recipients shared the 
attributes of being larger, wealthier, and more progressive.299 By contrast, 
smaller churches, particularly those in rural areas, do not feel they have the 
capability to apply; "they not only have limited resources, but they are also 
embedded in a very limited network.,,30o Thus, although black churches are 
more likely to have existing social service programs than other churches, 
they are less involved in charitable choice. This suggests that there is plenty 
of room for government to work effectively with black churches on 
alleviating poverty, but that charitable choice, as currently structured, may 
not be the best vehicle for such partnerships. 
B. Social Capital Perils and Promise 
Charitable choice proponents are very enthusiastic about the untapped 
social capital in churches, but there is almost no discussion of the potential 
dark side to social capital. Congregations in America usually consist of 
members who share the same racial, ethnic, and socio-economic 
backgrounds.301 While these commonalities foster bonding social capital,302 
homogeneity can also have a coercive side that perpetuates racial and class 
inequality.303 This homogeneity, along with the strict moral values and belief 
systems held by many denominations, can result in congregations excluding 
outsiders or withholding their assistance to persons deemed unworthy.304 
Even when they provide services to those in need, many congregations 
distinguish sharply between members and service recipients, and as a result, 
few outside aid recipients actually end up joining the congregation.305 
Moreover, social hierarchies can exist within congregations based on age, 
297. ld. at 4. 
298. See id. at 4. 
299. See id. at 5. 
300. ld. at 5. "Only three percent of the smallest churches applied for [a charitable choice] 
grant, and none received one." ld. at 6. 
301. See BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 191, at 20; FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 110. 
302. See CNAAN, supra note 187, at 262. 
303. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 12; BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 191, at 20. 
304. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 270; CNAAN, supra note 187, at 245; BARTKOWSKI 
& REGIS, supra note 191, at 21. 
305. See CNAAN, supra note 187, at 244-45. Most intermittent relief is for members and is 
often given with cultural judgments attached. See BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 191, at 165-67. 
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gender, and other cultural factors, and thus, charitable choice could 
inadvertently replicate these patterns in serving the needy.306 
Further, extensive bonding social capital within a congregation can 
sometimes result in less bridging social capital. For instance, a recent study 
of Mississippi churches found tight bonding within black congregations. 
However, as a result of those internal bonds, black churches lagged behind 
white churches in forming interdenominational partnerships.307 Similarly, 
another cross-jurisdictional study of welfare reform in Philadelphia, 
Milwaukee, and Kenosha, Wisconsin found that churches serving the 
poorest neighborhoods had no intention of developing bridging capital, 
choosing instead to focus internally on providing a safety net, spiritual 
support, and a social life for economically struggling members.308 For these 
churches, the long history of racial segregation and oppression resulted in a 
lack of trust in mainstream organizations and a corresponding emphasis on 
inward-looking se1f-help.309 
Thus, social capital does not always reinforce norms of social equality. 
To the degree charitable choice is founded on the notion that local churches 
will convert the morally destitute into devout members, the evidence 
suggests that social divides will preclude this transformation.3lo At the same 
time, it is doubtful that such a transformation is even necessary. Religion can 
be a powerful adjunct to the fight against poverty not because poor people 
are unmoored from moral or spiritual values, but rather because most poor 
people are already connected to faith communities.311 Moreover, 
congregations are the primary social institution in America where poverty is 
regularly confronted, discussed, and tackled.312 The challenge is to ensure 
that faith communities can playa meaningful role in welfare reform based 
on realistic expectations of their capacity. Assessments by welfare reform 
researchers across the country uniformly confirm that churches are integral 
to connecting the needy to social services and that, with adequate technical 
assistance and funding, these congregations could serve as even more 
effective intermediaries for their members and other needy persons within 
their communities. 
306. See BARTOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 222, at 20. 
307. See id. at 174. 
308. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 293-94. 
309. Id at281-85,293-94. 
310. See infra notes 291-292 and accompanying text. 
311. See Schneider, supra note 108, at 265. "Religion loomed large in the lives of many 
families" in Schneider's study of welfare recipients in three cities.ld. at 293. 
312. See CNAAN,supra note 187,at281. 
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IV. USING FAITH TO FIGHT POVERTY 
Prior to 1996, congregations and other religious groups could not apply 
directly for governmental grants to deliver social services.313 Instead, if they 
wanted to be considered as grantees, they had to create separate, tax-exempt 
affiliates.314 This system had advantages over charitable choice for all of the 
constituents involved in welfare programs. For welfare recipients, there was 
less risk for coercion because they usually received services in a secular 
atmosphere and were not subject to attempts at religious indoctrination.315 
For its part, the government did not have to spend extensive time and effort 
monitoring religious affiliates for potential First Amendment violations.316 
Current and potential employees of religious affiliates were also protected 
by the same anti-discrimination laws that governed other employers;317 by 
contrast, under charitable choice, grantees can discriminate on the basis of 
religion in their employment practices.3J8 For grantee organizations the prior 
system led to fewer worries about government entanglement with religious 
practices because the religious and secular components of organizations 
were formally separate.319 Moreover, religious groups were involved in 
government contracting prior to charitable choice, and they reported 
satisfaction with the church-state balance that had been struck.320 
From a managerial perspective, the creation of a tax-exempt affiliate 
also had tangible benefits. Non-profits who apply for tax-exempt status must 
create bylaws and articles of incorporation and fill out an application to the 
IRS that lists financial resources, potential conflicts of interest, a two-year 
budget, and a written narrative essay outlining the organization's existing 
and planned programs that will advance the organization's exempt 
313. See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 3 ("Many faith-based social service organizations 
contracted with government long before Charitable Choice and continue to do so."). 
314. See Green, supra note 68, at 36-37. 
315. See FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at 4; BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 36-
37. 
316. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 616 (1988) ("[T]here is no reason to assume that the 
religious organizations which may receive grants are "pervasively sectarian" in the same sense as the 
Court has held parochial schools to be. There is accordingly no reason to fear that the less intensive 
monitoring involved here will cause the Government to intrude unduly in the day-to-day operation of 
the religiously affiliated ... grantees."). 
317. See Melissa Rogers, Federal Funding and Religion-Based Employment Decisions, in 
POLET & RYDEN, supra note 13, at 106-07 (discussing the prohibition on discrimination in 
government contracting and under Title VII). 
318. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2000). 
319. Bowen, 478 U.S. at 616. 
320. See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 40 ("Many faith-based social service 
organizations contracted with government long before Charitable Choice and continue to do so."). 
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purpose.321 This process provides independence for the board of directors; a 
religious group might otherwise be dominated by the wishes of a single 
clergyperson. This process also forces the organization to take stock of its 
assets, financial and otherwise, and to engage in strategic planning.322 In 
tum, this increases the likelihood of receiving grants and running a 
successful program.323 None of these steps, however, are required for 
churches, who are awarded automatic tax-exempt status from the IRS.324 
This hands-off approach has historical and legal justifications for churches 
that are privately-funded, but churches that spend government money would 
be well-served by assessing and improving their internal infrastructure. 
Churches can benefit by forming separate affiliates in other ways as well. If 
there is a separate affiliate, it is easier to segregate government funds from 
church funds and thereby protect a church's financial information from 
government scrutiny.325 Separate affiliations also protect the religious 
organization from any liabilities incurred by the secular affiliate.326 
For all these reasons, it can be tempting to call for a return to pre-
charitable choice procurement practices. However, this system did not 
maximize the social capital offered by congregations, and thus, it missed an 
opportunity to better serve welfare recipients. Substantial social science 
research confirms that congregations have much to offer to our nation's 
welfare system-most congregations have committed volunteers, 
connections to other social service organizations, support networks for 
members, and the ability and desire to meet discrete, immediate needs in 
their communities.327 The spiritual motivation of congregational members is 
valuable, even if congregations do not deliver social services in a uniquely 
holistic manner to recipients. Moreover, congregations have the trust of their 
geographic communities as well as a moral legitimacy, which no 
government bureaucrat can claim. At the same time, congregations are no 
substitute for long-standing governmental and non-profit welfare programs. 
Congregations generally lack the administrative capacity and/or the desire to 
321. See Philip A. Faix, Jr., Organizing a Nonprofit Corporation, in NON-PROFIT 
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 469-83 (Victor Futter, ed. 2002) (describing fourteen steps 
involved in creating a tax-exempt nonprofit). 
322. [d. 
323. ARNOLD J. OLENICK & PHILIP R. OLENICK, A NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION OPERATING 
MANUAL: PLANNING FOR SURVIVAL AND GROWTH 45--46 (1991) (stating that organizational 
planning can "impress funding sources and donors" and "sets a framework for accountability"). 
324. LR.C. §§ 501(a), (c)(3); LR.C. §§ 508(a), (c)(I)(A). 
325. See David Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations: A 
Problem Best Avoided, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1353, 1395-96 n.182 (2003). 
326. See id.; OLENICK & OLENICK, supra note 323, at 34--36 (describing the benefits of 
incorporating). 
327. See supra Part lILA. 
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manage complex government contracts involving tasks such as job training 
and drug rehabilitation, which demand personal transformation from welfare 
recipients.328 In a limited pool of funds, providing churches with the 
technical support and training needed to run complex programs inevitably 
takes away funds from a shrinking pool that could otherwise directly benefit 
welfare recipients.329 Thus, congregations can only play an effective role in 
governmental welfare reform programs as long as policymakers are realistic 
about what congregations can offer. 
Given the variety of congregations in America, the differences in local 
welfare systems, and the diversity of welfare recipients, it is difficult to 
generalize about how best to channel congregational social capital. In our 
highly devolved and decentralized welfare system, the emphasis is on local 
solutions to local problems.33o Nevertheless, there are broad steps that 
policymakers can take to involve congregations in welfare systems in an 
effective and useful manner. Currently, many congregations link members to 
local social service agencies.331 However, churches often lack adequate 
information about resources in their community, and social service agencies 
are likewise uninformed about their local congregational resources.332 
Accordingly, government could help foster more formalized, collaborative 
networks that would provide education and information to congregations, 
local government, and social service agencies about available resources.333 
For instance, government grants could be used to fund positions for 
community organizers or congregational staff members who could develop 
and maintain these connections over time. Government could also bring 
together coalitions of leaders from congregations, social service agencies, 
and local government on an ongoing basis to exchange information and to 
conduct trainings about available resources both within and without the 
community. With better information and long-term collaborative efforts, 
social service agencies, both public and private, would better fulfill their 
missions and might benefit from donations and volunteer time of church 
members. At the same time, churches would better be able to serve the needs 
of their members and surrounding communities without sapping their 
internal resources and diverting them from their primary mission. 
328. See supra Part II.B. 
329. See FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at 1 72-73 (discussing how the lack of 
new money will cause resource-shifting from bureaucratic agencies to faith-based organizations). 
330. See Steven D. Schwinn, Toward a More Expansive Welfare Devolution Debate, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 3 11, 312-\3 (2005). 
331. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
332. See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 112-1 \3. 
333. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 317-18 (stating that churches are not capable of 
delivering social services on a large scale, but government can encourage collaboration among 
nonprofits, faith communities, and government). 
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Governments could also benefit from involving congregations in 
welfare planning and evaluation. Congregations have first-hand knowledge 
about needs and assets within their communities. They also have the trust of 
community members and speak with moral authority. Accordingly, 
congregations should be viewed as one of many stakeholders in the welfare 
procurement process. By allowing congregations to influence public policies 
that affect them, remaining barriers of mistrust can be eased. Moreover, such 
an approach could provide opportunities for empowerment that arise as 
church members gain valuable skills through public participation. 
Congregations could be helpful to policymakers in many ways, such as 
assessing community needs, providing input on program goals, gathering 
data on the effectiveness of social services, and serving as ombudsmen for 
service recipients. 
Government can also support congregations in the work they already do 
in meeting discrete, immediate needs, such as clothing and food. Additional 
funding could support and enhance the existing infrastructure in 
congregations that serve these community needs. Not only do congregations 
have the capacity to carry out these sorts of services without diminishing 
their core mission, but the risks of coercion are also lower in programs that 
do not involve long-term, intensive interpersonal counseling. As Justice 
Blackmun explained in dissent in the Bowen v. Kendrick case, "The risk of 
advancing religion at public expense, and of creating an appearance that the 
government is endorsing the medium and the message, is much greater when 
the religious organization is directly engaged in pedagogy, with the express 
intent of shaping belief and changing behavior, than where it is neutrally 
dispensing medication, food, or shelter."334 Accordingly, governments 
should consider focusing charitable choice grants on these latter types of 
services. These congregational services are effective not because a religious 
approach is better at feeding and clothing the poor, but because 
congregations have knowledge of community needs and the experience to 
meet discrete requests for assistance as they arise. 
In short, this proposal is based on the premise that government should 
not directly fund religious groups to deliver complex social services, but 
should instead do a better job of collaborating with congregations to better 
serve needy Americans and link them with available services. This approach 
would maintain the substantial benefits of the pre-charitable choice system 
in which religious groups created separate affiliates to deliver social 
services, while enhancing that system by providing a meaningful role for 
congregations. In low-income communities, churches are often the most 
long-standing and influential institutions, and many welfare recipients are 
already connected to them.335 It is a mistake to overlook the social capital 
334. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 641 (1988) (B1ackmun, J., dissenting). 
335. See supra Part III. 
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these congregations offer, but it is also a mistake to rely on them to deliver 
comprehensive social services. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Ten years of experience with charitable choice reveals that 
congregations lack the administrative capacity to enter long-term 
government contracts, that a spiritual approach is not more effective than a 
secular one in social service delivery, and that religious organizations are not 
adequately accountable to the public, government, or welfare recipients for 
the charitable choice funds they receive. Moreover, many religious 
organizations that receive charitable choice funds are falling off the 
constitutional tightrope that they must balance to comply with the 
Establishment Clause. As a result, some of our most vulnerable citizens are 
subject to the involuntary indoctrination of religion-a consequence clearly 
at odds with the First Amendment. 
Despite what we have learned over the last ten years, hundreds of years 
of experience suggest that congregations can and should play an integral role 
in assisting the needy. In the future, we should acknowledge both the 
promise and the perils of bringing religious organizations into the 
government contracting fold. Congregations, in particular, are exemplary at 
meeting discrete community needs and in collaborating with other 
organizations to solve more complex social problems. Instead of pushing 
congregations to take on tasks for which they are ill-suited, policyrnakers 
should build charitable choice initiatives on the existing strengths offered by 
religious groups. 
